Temporal role-based access control models support the specification and enforcement of several temporal constraints on role enabling, role activation, and temporal role hierarchies among others. In this paper, we define three mappings that preserve the solutions to a class of policy problems: they map security analysis problems in presence of static temporal role hierarchies to problems without them. We show how our mappings can be used to extend the capabilities of a tool for the analysis of administrative temporal role-based access control policies to reason in presence of temporal role hierarchies. We carried out an experimental evaluation with a prototype implementation, which highlighted that one of the proposed mappings behaves better than the other two. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first tool capable of reasoning with (static) temporal role hierarchies.
Introduction
Modern information systems hold sensitive information that authorized users need to access in order to do their work and unauthorized users want to access for personal profit. The most important mechanism to prevent unintended disclosure of sensitive information is Access Control (AC) [13] , which is the process of mediating every request to data and services maintained by a system and determining whether the request should be granted or denied. By doing this, AC supports the protection of data and services (generically called resources) against unauthorised disclosure (confidentiality) and intentional or accidental unauthorised changes (integrity), while-at the same time-ensuring their accessibility by authorised users when needed (availability). 0926-227X/18/$27.50 c 2018 -IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved Once security policies are defined, they need to be maintained and updated according to evolving protection requirements dictated by the rapidly changing environments in which organizations operate. Usually, a policy changes as an organization modifies its structure or in order to correct some discrepancies that have been detected between the intended protection requirements and those that are actually supported by the policies. The actions that modify the policies are called administrative actions and are usually carried out by a selected sub-set of the members of the organization, called administrators or security officers. The fact that the vast majority of today's IT systems is distributed further complicates the problem of policy administration. Large and heterogeneous IT systems include several administrators, and thus the goal is not only to have a policy that corresponds to the intended protection requirements, but also to ensure that the policy is only modified by the administrators who are allowed to do so. Indeed, permissions to perform administrative actions must be restricted since security officers can only be partially trusted. Some of them may collude to, inadvertently or maliciously, modify an access control policy P to a new one P so that a permission p to perform some sensitive action is leaked to a user u (i.e., u was not in possession of p under policy P but u has permission p under policy P ).
Taking into consideration the effect of all possible sequences of administrative actions transforming P into P is a computationally expensive task. Thus, push-button analysis techniques are needed to identify safety issues, i.e., whether permissions can be leaked to users. This is known as the safety problem [17] , which amounts to establishing whether there exists a (finite) sequence of administrative actions, selected from a set of available ones, that, applied to a given initial policy, yield a policy in which a certain permission is leaked. Several important policy analysis problems can be reduced to the safety problem, e.g., deciding if the set of users having a given permission is a subset of that having another permission (containment), computing the minimal sets of permissions that a user should have so as to make another policy reachable by means of a finite sequence of administrative actions (weakest preconditions), and other problems (see, e.g., [15] for reductions). This makes automated techniques capable of solving safety problems even more valuable so as to be able to understand the subtle interplay among the actions performed by several administrators.
Unfortunately, the safety problem is-in general-undecidable [17] . To overcome this issue, two alternative approaches are available: either (a) identify a fragment of the access control policies admitting a decision procedure for a restricted version of the safety problem or (b) consider unrestricted policies and design heuristic (albeit incomplete) methods capable of solving practically relevant instances of the general safety problem. For instance, several techniques for alternative (a) have been proposed for administrative models of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policies [33] as witnessed by a long stream of papers, e.g., [21, 3, 38, 24, 39, 6, 1, 7, 18, 15, 31, 28, 44] ; whereas alternative (b) has been less investigated (see, e.g., [4, 5] ).
In this work, we take alternative (a) to study the safety analysis problem for an extension of RBAC with temporal constraints [9, 20] . We do not consider alternative (b) because of two reasons. First, the expressiveness of the access control policies in [9, 20] greatly complicates the task of designing heuristics capable of solving practical instances of the generic safety problem. Second, three proposals [41, 29, 35] have been recently put forward to automatically solve restricted versions of the safety problems for administrative temporal RBAC policies; these proposals strike a good balance between expressiveness and automation by defining a simplified version of the temporal RBAC model in [20] . Indeed, such a simplified model-while taking into consideration periodicity constraints on role enabling and role activationdisregards other features of the model in [20] , such as duration constraints and role hierarchies. As a consequence, none of the works [41, 29, 35] can deal with these core features, thereby limiting the scope of applicability of the proposed techniques for safety analysis.
Contributions
In this paper, we alleviate this limitation by extending available automated techniques for the safety analysis of temporal RBAC policies to take into account temporal role hierarchies. We achieve this by making the following three contributions.
1. We propose a formal model of administrative temporal RBAC policies with static temporal role hierarchies as an extension of the one proposed in [29] (which, as observed in [35] , is a syntactic extension of the one proposed in [41] ). The starting point of our extension is the notion of role hierarchy in RBAC [33] , formalized as a partial order. The idea is to extend it to a collection of partial orders indexed over time intervals during which the hierarchies are assumed to hold. It is then possible to extend the temporal constraints on role activation and role enabling to take into account a temporal role hierarchy. 2. Modelling temporal role hierarchies as an extension of role hierarchies in RBAC allows us to extend a well-known technique [39] for eliminating role hierarchies from RBAC policies to temporal RBAC policies. The idea is to modify the administrative actions so as to make explicit any reference to the roles left implicit in a hierarchy and eliminate the need to consider the hierarchy. As a consequence, available techniques for safety analysis of administrative temporal RBAC policies without role hierarchies (such as [29] ) can be used. We elaborate this idea further and present two additional translations that address the computational overhead introduced by the first translation. 3. Finally, we integrate a prototype of the three translations defined above in the tool ASASP-TIME [29] and carry out an experimental comparison of its performance. For the latter, we use synthetic benchmarks obtained by adding randomly generated temporal role hierarchies to the administrative temporal policies used in previous work [29] and based on realistic policies. This way of creating benchmarks is current practice for the evaluation of the scalability of tools for safety analysis. 1 . The extended version of ASASPTIME is the first tool capable of reasoning in presence of temporal role hierarchies striking a good trade-off between scalability and precision with which the semantics of the temporal RBAC model is considered.
We develop our results in the framework of access control schemes proposed in [40] . In this context, the three translations that we define to eliminate temporal role hierarchies correspond to particular security mappings between access control schemes in terms of [40] , and their correctness can be shown by standard techniques discussed in that paper. 2 1 As in many other papers in the literature (see, e.g., [39, 18, 15, 1, 44, 41] ), the evaluation is based on benchmarks derived from synthetic policies. In many cases, these are generated by identifying a realistic policy (e.g., for a bank or a hospital) together with some parameters that can be increased so that larger and larger instances of the same policy can be generated. Indeed, the goal is to evaluate the scalability of the proposed techniques. Unfortunately, the significance of the experimental results obtained in this way is debatable. The results reported in this paper suffer from the same problem. We believe that a community effort is needed to build up a common database of benchmarks, derived from real-world policies, that can be used to evaluate and compare old and new analysis techniques. Similar initiative in other fields (e.g., SAT/SMT solving (http: //www.satlive.org and http://www.smtlib.org), Planning (http://ipc.icaps-conference.org) and Verification (http://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2014)) have greatly contributed to their advance. We believe this is a great opportunity also for increasing the impact of the safety analysis of access control policies in security. We hope that these remarks will stimulate further discussion and work in the community. 2 This paper is an extended version of [30] . Highlights of the extension include:
1. the complete formalization of the model for administrative temporal RBAC policies with static temporal role hierarchies (Section 3), 2. several examples illustrating the formal notions that we introduce, Plan of the paper. In Section 2, we introduce the notions of access control schemes and security mappings between them (adapted from [40] ). We illustrate these notions by formalizing standard administrative RBAC (ARBAC) policies with and without role hierarchies. In Section 2.1, we define ARBAC Flat and then, in Section 2.2, we recast a known technique to pre-process away role hierarchies as a security mapping. In Section 3, we define administrative temporal RBAC policies (ATRBAC) with Static Temporal Hierarchies as the access control scheme ATRBACH . In Section 4, we define three translations to eliminate temporal role hierarchies as three security mappings from ATRBACH and show their correctness by proving how safety problems for ATRBACH can be transformed (preserving solutions) to safety problems for temporal RBAC policies without role hierarchies. The main difficulty in these proofs is to show that the mappings correctly take into account the interplay among temporal role hierarchies, role enabling constraints, and role activation constraints. In Section 5, we summarize the technique on which ASASPTIME is based, how it has been extended to integrate an implementation of the mappings introduced in Section 4, and we present an experimental evaluation of the prototype on a set of synthetic benchmarks. In Section 6, we discuss related work and, finally, in Section 7, we draw conclusions and discuss future work (in particular, we explain how to extend the approach proposed in this work to handle the dynamic temporal role hierarchies considered in [42] ).
To ease reading, in Table 1 .1 we give a roadmap for the main notions considered in the paper.
Access Control Schemes
We introduce the notions of access control schemes, access control systems, and security analysis instances by adapting them from [40] . Definition 1 An access control scheme is a state-transition system Γ, Q, , Ψ , where Γ is the set of states, Q is a set of queries, : Γ × Q → {true, false} is the query answering relation, and Ψ is a set of transition rules.
We write γ → ψ γ when a transition from γ ∈ Γ to γ ∈ Γ is allowed by a rule in ψ ⊆ Ψ. We use → * ψ to denote the reflexive and transitive closure of → ψ , and when γ → * ψ γ we say that γ is ψ-reachable from γ (or simply "reachable from γ" when ψ is clear from the context).
Definition 2
Consider an access control scheme Γ, Q, , Ψ .
-An access control system is a pair (γ, ψ), where γ ∈ Γ and ψ ⊆ Ψ.
-A security analysis instance (SAI) is the triple γ, q, ψ , where γ ∈ Γ, q ∈ Q and ψ ⊆ Ψ, and asks whether there exists γ ∈ Γ such that γ is ψ-reachable from γ and γ q. When the answer to the query encoded by a SAI is positive, we say that it is solvable; otherwise, it is unsolvable.
In the following, we focus on role-based access control schemes with and without role hierarchies. To clarify which case we are considering, we append at the end of the name of an access control scheme the letter "F" to denote the scheme for the standard (flat) model without role hierarchies, the letter "H"' to denote the scheme for the standard model with role hierarchies. 3 . the proofs of the correctness of the three translations to eliminate temporal role hierarchies (in Section 4.1.3, Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.3), and 4. a description of the architecture of the ASASPTIME tool extended with the three security mappings (Section 5.1). 5. a discussion about the application of our approach to the analysis of policies with dynamic temporal role hierarchies (Section 7).
Administrative RBAC without role hierarchy: ARBAC Flat
We now formalize the access control scheme
corresponding to the ARBAC model without role hierarchy in [39] .
Definition 3 Let U , R and P respectively be sets of users, roles and permissions.
An RBAC policy is a tuple (U, R, P, UA, PA), where users are associated to roles by a binary relation UA ⊆ U × R and roles are associated to permissions by a binary relation PA ⊆ R × P .
If (u, r) ∈ UA, then we say that a user u is a member of role r in the RBAC policy γ = (U, R, P, UA, PA), and if there exists a role r ∈ R such that (r, p) ∈ PA and u is a member of r, then we say that u has permission p in γ.
We define Γ ARBACF to be the set of all RBAC policies.
RBAC policies need to be maintained according to the evolving needs of organizations. For flexibility and scalability, large systems usually require several administrators, and thus there is a need not only to have a consistent RBAC policy, but also to ensure that the policy is only modified by administrators who are authorized to do so. One of the most popular administrative frameworks is Administrative RBAC (ARBAC) [11] , which controls how RBAC policies may evolve through administrative actions that assign or revoke user memberships into roles, i.e., they can only update the relation UA while PA is constant. Since administrators can be only partially trusted, administration privileges must be limited to selected parts of the RBAC policies, called administrative domains. An administrative domain is specified by a pre-condition defined as follows.
Definition 4 A pre-condition is a finite set of signed roles of the forms +r or −r for r ∈ R.
Permission to assign users to roles is specified by a ternary relation can_assign containing tuples of the form (C a , C, r), where C a (called administrative) and C (called simple) are pre-conditions, and r is a role (called target). Permission to revoke users from roles is then specified by a binary relation can_revoke containing pairs (C a , r). Note that can_revoke is only binary because simple pre-conditions are useless when revoking roles (see, e.g., [39] ).
Definition 5 A user u ∈ U satisfies a pre-condition C with respect to a given policy γ = (U, R, P, UA, PA), written as u |= γ C, if for each ∈ C, u is a member of r ∈ R when is +r, or u is not a member of r ∈ R when is −r.
We omit the policy γ when it is clear from the context.
Let Ψ ARBACF be the disjoint union of the administrative actions in can_assign and can_revoke (in the following, we abbreviate RBAC policies by the UA relation since all other sets and relations remain constant). The effect of the administrative actions in ψ ⊆ Ψ ARBACF is given by the binary relation → ψ , which is defined as follows.
Definition 6 UA → ψ UA iff there exist users a, u ∈ U such that either there exists δ = (C a , C, r t ) in ψ with a |= C a , u |= C, and UA = UA ∪ {(u, r t )}, or there exists δ = (C a , r t ) in ψ with a |= C a , u |= {+r t } , and UA = UA \ {(u, r t )}.
Note that in both cases in Definition 6 we also write UA → δ UA to emphasize that action δ ∈ ψ causes the effect. We illustrate the definitions with an example inspired by the hospital scenario in [29] .
, HED (head), SEC (Secretary), CHR (Chairman)}, and let the set ψ contain the actions
Assume that the current policy is UA = {(u 1 , CHR), (u 2 , EMP ), (u 3 , DDR)}. Let us consider action (1): the administrative pre-condition is C a = {CHR}, the simple pre-condition is C = {EMP , −NRS }, and the target role is DDR. It is easy to check that:
Action (1) can be executed by administrator u 1 because of (i) and (ii). The effect of executing action (1) on the current state is that
Despite the restrictions imposed on administrative actions, it is very difficult to foresee if a subset of the security officers can maliciously (or inadvertently) assign to an untrusted user a role that enables the user to get access to security-sensitive resources. To understand if this is the case, we define the set Q ARBACF to contain queries of the form (u g , {R 1 g , ..., R r g }), where u g ∈ U and R i g ⊆ R for i = 1, ..., r ≥ 1. Definition 7 For γ ∈ Γ ARBACF and q = (u g , {R 1 g , ..., R r g }) ∈ Q ARBACF , the query answering relation ARBACF is defined as follows: γ ARBACF q iff u g is a member of each role of R i g in the RBAC policy γ for some i = 1, ..., r.
A Security Analysis Instance (SAI) γ, q, ψ for γ ∈ Γ ARBACF , q ∈ Q ARBACF , and ψ ⊆ Ψ ARBACF is the formalization in the framework of access control schemes (adapted from [40] ) of the user-role reachability problem (for RBAC policies without role hierarchy) considered in [39] , which amounts to checking if there exists γ ∈ Γ ARBACF such that γ → * ψ γ and γ ARBACF q.
Example 2 Let us consider again Example 1 and a query q = (u 2 , {{DDR, PRC }}); note that we have only one set R 1 g = {DDR, PRC } in the query. A SAI (UA, q, ψ) is solvable by a sequence of actions ω = (1), (2), (3) such that
We do not use the original formulation of the user-role reachability problem in [39] but rather rephrase it as a SAI since this allows for the use of the notion of security mapping (introduced below), following the approach proposed in [40] . We can then show that searching for the solutions of a SAI sai is equiva-lent to searching for the solutions of a SAI obtained by applying a security mapping to sai . To illustrate this, below we show how user-role reachability problems for ARBAC policies with role hierarchies can be solved by transforming these into user-role reachability problems for ARBAC policies without role hierarchies.
Security Mappings

Definition 8 Given two access control schemes
The mapping σ from A to B extends to SAIs as follows.
From ARBAC with role hierarchy (ARBACH ) to ARBAC without role hierarchy (ARBACF )
corresponding to the ARBAC model with role hierarchy in [39] . ARBACH extends ARBACF by considering a role hierarchy RH in the RBAC policy to reflect the natural structure of an organization, and makes the specification of policies more compact by requiring that one role may implicitly include the permissions that are associated with other roles that are less senior according to RH . Formally, RH is a partial order on R, where (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ RH means that r 1 ∈ R is more senior than r 2 ∈ R.
Definition 10 An RBAC policy with hierarchy is a tuple (U, R, P, UA, PA, RH ).
We say that a user u is a member of role r in (U, R, P, UA, PA, RH ) when there exists role r ∈ R such that (r , r) ∈ RH and (u, r ) ∈ UA; note that this is different from the role membership in ARBACF in which we do not take into consideration the role hierarchy.
User u has permission p in (U, R, P, UA, PA, RH ) if there exists a role r ∈ R such that (r, p) ∈ PA and u is a member of r.
We are now ready to define ARBACH :
-Γ ARBACH is the set of all RBAC policies with hierarchy; -ARBACH = ARBACF ; -Ψ ARBACH = Ψ ARBACF with the proviso that the role membership relation is interpreted by taking into account the role hierarchy; -Q ARBACH is the set of queries of the form (u g , R g ) with u g ∈ U and R g ⊆ R.
The definition of → ARBACH is the same as that of → ARBACF (cf. Definition 6) with the difference that, in the definition of u |= C, the fact that u is a member or not of a signed role in C is interpreted with respect to the role hierarchy RH in the RBAC policy. Like for ARBACF , a SAI γ, q, ψ for γ ∈ Γ ARBACH , q ∈ Q ARBACH and ψ ⊆ Ψ ARBACH is the formalization in the framework of access control schemes (adapted from [40] ) of the user-role reachability problem (for RBAC policies with role hierarchy) considered in [39] . As anticipated above, the motivation for doing this is the possibility to define and reason about a security mapping relating the SAIs based on ARBACH with those based on ARBACF . Note that the set Q ARBACH of queries can be seen as a sub-set of Q ARBACF in which only one set of roles is given.
In fact, every SAI for ARBACH can be transformed into one for ARBACF such that the latter is solvable iff the former is so. For this, based on a transformation proposed in [34] , we define a securitypreserving mapping σ H2F whose aim is to make the effects of inherited role membership explicit. We will use the abbreviations
where r i ∈ R for i = 1, ..., n. We also introduce the notation C + (C − , respectively) for the set of positive (negative, respectively) roles in a set C ⊆ R.
as follows:
γ F = (U, R, P, UA, PA) for γ H = (U, R, P, UA, PA, RH ), q F = (u g , {{r 1 g , ..., r m g } | (r 1 g , ..., r m g ) ∈ Senior RH (R g )}) for q H = (u g , R g ), ψ F is obtained from ψ H by applying the following two transformations, one after the other, with the proviso that ψ H and ψ F are the smallest relation such that (1) for each (C a , C, r t ) ∈ ψ H : (C a ∪ {−r a | −r a ∈ C a and r a ∈ Senior RH (r a )}, C ∪ {−r | −r ∈ C and r ∈ Senior RH (r)}, r t ) ∈ ψ H , and for each (C a , r t ) ∈ ψ H : (C a ∪ {−r a | −r a ∈ C a and r a ∈ Senior RH (r a )}, r t ) ∈ ψ H ,
g , ..., R r g }) and r ≥ 1 according to how many elements are in Senior RH (R g ). The idea is to ensure that if a role senior to r g ∈ R g is reachable, then also r g is reachable. As a consequence, there is no need to transform also the target roles in the administrative actions. It is easy to show that any sequence of administrative actions for γ H , q H , ψ H can be transformed into one for γ F , q F , ψ F and vice versa as suggested in [34] . This entails the following theorem.
Theorem 1 σ H2F is a security mapping.
Note that, in the worst case, σ H2F can increase the size of the SAI (cf. the transformation of the query and the conditions of administrative actions) by an exponential factor. Example 4 Consider the query q H = (u 2 , {DDR, PRC }) in Example 2, the role hierarchy RH as in Example 3, the set ψ H = ψ and the current policy UA as in Example 1. We illustrate how the security mapping σ H2F works as follows:
q H is transformed into q F = (u 2 , {{DDR, PRC }, {HED, PRC }}) because HED is a senior role of DDR with respect to RH . ψ F is obtained by transforming actions in ψ H as follows:
* Action (1) is transformed into two actions:
We conclude this section by observing that Theorem 1 is a formalization in the framework of access control schemes of a result from [34] . This allows us not only to illustrate the main notions introduced above but also to prepare the ground for the definition of the first security mapping relating administrative temporal RBAC policies with and without temporal role hierarchies (cf. Section 4.1) that is inspired to σ H2F .
Administrative Temporal RBAC with Static Role Hierarchies: ATRBACH
We extend the ATRBAC model in [29] with static temporal role hierarchies to define the access control scheme
We do this in several steps. First, we introduce a temporal extension to RBAC policies with role hierarchies (Section Section 3.1). Then, we define administrative actions for the temporal RBAC policies previously introduced (Section Section 3.2) together with their SAI (Section Section 3.3).
Temporal RBAC with Static Role Hierarchies
Preliminarily, we introduce a simple model of time. The goal is to express authorization conditions that depend on temporal constraints, which are usually specified by means of periodically repeating time intervals, such as day/night-time intervals (two intervals repeating daily), hourly intervals (twenty-four intervals again repeating daily), or daily intervals (seven intervals repeating weekly).
Definition 12
Let T MAX be a positive integer and a a non-negative integer such that a + 1 ≤ T MAX . A time slot is a pair (a, a + 1) and the set of all time slots is
To ease readability, we will use concrete time intervals, e.g., (8am, 4pm), (4pm, 12am) and (12am, 8am) to denote respectively the time slots (0, 1), (1, 2) and (2, 3), where, in general, such time intervals need not have the same length.
Definition 13
A time instant is a non-negative real number. A time instant t belongs to a time slot (a, a + 1), written as t ∈ (a, a + 1), iff a ≤ (t mod T MAX ) < a + 1. 3 Below, we assume T MAX to be given so that the set TS of all time slots is fixed. A Temporal RBAC policy γ with static temporal role hierarchies extends an RBAC policy in three respects:
1. TRBAC adds the role status relation RS ⊆ R × TS , which is such that (r, ts) ∈ RS iff role r becomes enabled (i.e., a user can acquire the permissions associated to r, via PA) during time slot ts; we then say that r is enabled at all time instants in ts. 2. The user-role assignment relation UA is replaced by the temporal user-role assignment TUA ⊆ U × R × TS , which makes the association of users with roles dependent on time slots so that (enabled) roles become active when users acquire the permissions assigned to roles in a session. 3. We consider temporal constraints on the role hierarchy that restrict the time during which the hierarchy is valid but cannot change its structure by modifying the relative positions of roles. In other words, we assume static role hierarchies in which the temporal constraints on role enabling determine whether the role hierarchy will provide inheritance for a role at a given time. This type of role inheritance is called activation-semantics in, e.g., [20] , and can be formalized as follows. A relation TRH ⊆ R × R × TS is a (static) temporal role hierarchy iff TRH ts is a partial order on the set R of roles for each time slot ts in TS , where TRH ts = {(r , r) | (r , r, ts) ∈ TRH }. Intuitively, (r , r, ts) ∈ TRH means that r is more senior than r during time slot ts.
Definition 14
A hierarchical TRBAC policy is a tuple π = (U, R, P, RS , TUA, PA, TRH ), where U , R, P , and PA are as for RBAC policies, RS is the role status relation, TUA is the temporal user-role assignment relation and TRH is a temporal role hierarchy. We say that user u is a member of role r (with respect to the TRBAC policy π) in time slot ts when there exists r ∈ R such that (r , r, ts) ∈ TRH and (u, r , ts) ∈ TUA. User u has permission p in π if there exists a role r ∈ R such that (r, p) ∈ PA and u is a member of role r in a certain time slot ts.
We define Γ ATRBACH to be the set of all hierarchical TRBAC policies.
We illustrate the definitions by extending the hospital scenario considered in Example 1 with time constraints.
Example 5 We assume that the hospital in Example 1 works for 24 hours (i.e., T MAX = 24) with the set TS containing three time slots: ts 1 contains time instants from 8am to 4pm; ts 2 is from 4pm to 12am; and ts 3 is from 12am to 8am. Let us consider the TRBAC policy (U, R, P, RS 0 , TUA 0 , PA, TRH ), where RS 0 = (CHR, ts 1 ), (CHR, ts 2 ), (DDR, ts 2 ), (NDR, ts 3 ) ,
It is easy to see that:
-Role CHR is more senior than role SEC during time slot ts 1 since (CHR, SEC , ts 1 ) ∈ TRH .
-User u 1 is an implicit member of role SEC during time slot ts 1 since he is an explicit member of role CHR during ts 1 and (CHR, SEC , ts 1 ) ∈ TRH . 2
Administrative actions for Temporal RBAC policies with Static Role Hierarchies
In the following, we assume the definition of pre-condition given in Section 2 for ARBAC actions (cf. Definition 4). We introduce the notion of a schedule as a set of time slots and say that a time instant t belongs to schedule s (in symbols, t ∈ s) iff there exists a time slot ts in s such that t belongs to ts.
Definition 15
Let π = (U, R, P, RS , TUA, PA, TRH ) be a hierarchical TRBAC policy, ts a time slot, C a pre-condition, u a user, t a time instant and s a schedule.
-Time slot ts satisfies C under RS (in symbols, ts |= RS C) iff r is enabled at ts for each +r ∈ C, and r is not enabled at ts for each −r ∈ C. -Schedule s satisfies C under RS (in symbols, s |= RS C) iff ts |= RS C for each ts ∈ s.
-User u and time slot ts satisfy C under TUA (in symbols, u, ts |= TUA C) iff u is a member of r in ts for each +r ∈ C, and u is not a member of r in ts for each −r ∈ C. -User u and schedule s satisfy C under TUA (in symbols, u, s |= TUA C) iff u, ts |= TUA C for each ts ∈ s.
u and ts satisfy C under RS and TUA at time instant t (in symbols, u, ts |= @t RS ,TUA C) iff t ∈ ts, ts |= RS C and u, ts |= TUA C.
u and s satisfy C under RS and TUA at time instant t (in symbols, u, s |= @t RS ,TUA C) iff t ∈ s, s |= RS C, and u, s |= TUA C.
We introduce two kinds of possible administrative actions: those that enable or disable a role r by modifying the time slots associated to r in RS , and those that change the time slots constraining a userrole association in TUA.
Definition 16 A (temporal) administrative action has the form (ty, C a , s rule , C, s r , r), where ty is the type of the action (i.e., can_enable, can_disable, can_assign or can_revoke), C a is the administrative pre-condition and C is the simple pre-condition, s rule and s r are schedules, and r is the target role.
An administrative action of type can_enable (respectively, can_disable) enables (respectively, disables) a role associated to some time slot in RS , while leaving unchanged TUA. An administrative action of type can_assign (respectively, can_revoke) assigns (respectively, revokes) a role associated to a user for some time slot in TUA, while leaving RS unchanged. We define Ψ ATRBACH to be the set of all (temporal) administrative actions.
Administrative actions are executed instantaneously and are interleaved with time-passing transitions for incrementing time. Formally, the effect of the administrative actions in ψ ⊆ Ψ ATRBACH is given by the binary relation → ATRBACH , which is defined as follows, where-since actions affect only relations RS and TUA together with the time instant t-we write (RS , TUA, t) to abbreviate a state ((U, R, P, RS , TUA, PA), t) in Γ ATRBACH : In case 2, we also write (RS , TUA, t) → ac (RS , TUA , t) to emphasize that action ac ∈ ψ causes the effect.
The intuition underlying the long definition above is the following. Case 1 models time passing in which only the time instant t is updated whereas RS and TUA are left unchanged. Case 2 is divided in four sub-cases corresponding to the application of one of the four types of administrative action in Ψ ATRBACH . All sub-cases share the fact that, at a given time instant t belonging to a sub-schedule s a of s rule , the action is executed under the responsibility of an administrator a satisfying the administrative condition C a , i.e., positive and negative roles in the pre-condition are, respectively, enabled and disabled according to RS and a is a member of positive roles and not a member of negative roles according to both TUA and TRH (cf. the definition of |= @t RS ,TUA ). An action of type can_enable or can_disable (subcases 2.a.i and 2.a.ii, respectively) can be executed provided that the simple condition C is satisfied by the current RS relation, i.e., when the positive roles in C are enabled and the negative ones are disabled in some sub-scheduleŝ of s r . For actions of type can_assign or can_revoke (sub-cases 2.b.i and 2.b.ii, respectively), the target role r t is assigned to or revoked from the user u satisfying the simple condition C with respect to TUA and TRH , i.e., the positive roles in C are active for u while the negative ones are not active for u. Note that the definition of |= RS above is not affected by the temporal role hierarchy TRH since enabling (or disabling) a role does not imply that all its junior roles are also enabled (or disabled).
Example 6
Consider again the TRBAC policy in Example 5 and an ATRBAC system with the following set ψ of temporal administrative actions:
For action (5), we can easily check that:
Because of (i)-(iv), action (5) can be executed to change the status of the ATRBAC system as follows:
where TUA 1 = TUA 0 and RS 1 = RS 0 ∪ {(SEC , ts 2 )}, i.e., role SEC is set to be enabled during time slot ts 2 . 2
SAI for Administrative Temporal RBAC with Static Role Hierarchies
We define Q ATRBACH to be the set of (temporal) queries of the form (u g , R g , s g ), where u g is a user, R g ⊆ R is a set of roles and s g is a schedule. Moreover, we define (RS , TUA, t) ATRBACH (u, R, s) iff u, s |= @t RS ,TUA {+r | r ∈ R}, i.e., t belongs to the schedule s, which is such that all roles in R are enabled in each time slot of s and u is a member of all roles in R in each time slot of s.
A SAI γ, q, ψ for γ ∈ Γ ATRBACH , q ∈ Q ATRBACH , and ψ ⊆ Ψ ATRBACH generalizes the reachability problem for ATRBAC policies considered in [41, 29] to take into account (static) temporal role hierarchies and amounts to checking if there exists a ψ-reachable state
Example 7 Consider again the ATRBAC system in Example 6 and a temporal query q = (u 2 , PRC , ts 3 ). The SAI (RS 0 , TUA 0 , 9am), q, ψ is solvable because of the sequence of temporal actions σ = (5), (6), i.e.,
where RS 1 , TUA 1 are as in Example 6, RS 2 = RS 1 , and TUA 2 = TUA 1 ∪ (u 2 , PRC , ts 3 ). 2
Security Mappings from ATRBACH
We describe three security mappings from ATRBACH into three access control schemes whose SAIs can be easily translated to reachability problems that can be solved by available analysis techniques (see Section 5.1). The first security mapping τ H2eF is a temporalised version of σ H2F : this is not surprising since ATRBACH generalizes the ATRBAC scheme without temporal role hierarchies in the same way in which ARBACH generalizes ARBACF . Similar to σ H2F , the goal of τ H2F is to make explicit the effects of inherited role membership. However, the fact that roles should be enabled to activate them complicates the definition of τ H2F with respect to that of σ H2F ; in fact, we need to keep track of the original administrative condition of any administrative action to check which roles must and must not be enabled.
The second security mapping τ H2L tries to overcome the exponential blow up in the size of the SAIs obtained by applying τ H2F . The idea to do this is to consider a new administrative action, say of type ican_assign, for each role r j that is junior to a target role in an administrative action of type can_assign, which can assign users to r j if they are already assigned to the target role. The problem then is the mapping of administrative actions of type can_revoke, since we need to keep track of which roles have been assigned because of target roles of can_assign actions or those that are assigned because of target roles of ican_assign actions.
The third security mapping τ H2M is based on the same idea of τ H2L . The main difference is in the definition of ican_assign: one such action assigns to a user all the roles that are junior to a target role in an administrative action of type can_assign. So, if r 1 , . . . , r k are the roles junior to a target role of an administrative action of type ican_assign, the mapping τ H2M introduces just one action whose effect is the same of executing atomically (i.e., one after the other with no interleaving of other actions) k actions of type ican_assign introduced by τ H2L .
Before we formally define the three security mappings above, let us observe that, as discussed in [41] , any action (ty, C a , s rule , C, s r , r) can be reduced to a finite collection of actions of the form (ty, C a , {ts rule }, C, {ts r }, r), where ts rule ∈ s rule and ts r ∈ s r (we will omit the curly braces around ts rule and ts r for simplicity). Thus, from now on, we assume that administrative actions are of this form to simplify the technical development.
τ H2F : a Temporalised Version of σ H2F
We introduce the access control scheme that is the target of the security mapping (Section Section 4.1.1) and then define the security mapping itself (Section Section 4.1.2). We then show the correctness of the mapping (Section Section 4.1.3).
Definition of ATRBACF
First of all, we define the access control scheme
that is the target of the security mapping τ H2F . ATRBACF is related to ATRBACH as ARBACF is related to ARBACH (see Section 2).
-We define Γ ATRBACF to contain all temporal RBAC policies of the form π = (U, R, P, RS , TUA, PA), where all components are as in Section 3. In practice, the elements of Γ ATRBACF are obtained from those in Γ ATRBACH by omitting the temporal role hierarchies. -We define Ψ ATRBACF to contain tuples of the form (ty, C e a , C a , s rule , C, s r , r), where ty, C a , s rule , C, s r and r are as in the actions of Ψ ATRBACH and C e a is the (original) enabling condition. In practice, the elements of Ψ ATRBACF are obtained from those in Ψ ATRBACH by adding the original enabling condition C e a to keep track of the roles that are enabled and that permit the execution of (certain) administrative actions. As we will see, this is crucial for defining the mapping τ H2F so as to preserve the meaning of the enabling condition in presence of a temporal role hierarchy.
g , . . . , R r g sub-sets of R, and s g a schedule. Note that the queries in Q ATRBACF have an additional component with respect to those of Q ATRBACH (which have only three components). This is so because the satisfaction relation ATRBACF defined below checks the enabling condition by using the set R g of roles whereas it checks for role activation by using one of the sets R 1 g , . . . , R r g in a query. The addition of R g to the fields composing a query is crucial for preserving the satis-fiability of queries in presence of the temporal role hierarchy as it was the case for the addition of fields to actions in the previous item. This will be clear in the definition of τ H2F in Section 4.1.2 below. -We define ATRBACF to be such that (RS , TUA, t) ATRBACF (u g , R g , {R 1 g , . . . , R r g }, s g ) iff s g |= RS R g and u g , s g |= TUA R i g for some i = 1, . . . , r. -Finally, the definition of the relation → ATRBACF can be derived from that of → ATRBACH in Section 3 by simply replacing the first two lines of case 2 with 2. there exist (ty, C e a , C a , s rule , C, s r , r) ∈ ψ, a ∈ U , and s a ⊆ s rule such that t ∈ s, s a |= RS C e a , and a, s a |= TUA C a and either... Note that while case 2 in the definition of → ATRBACH uses the same administrative condition C a in the checks with |= RS and |= TUA , the definition of → ATRBACF uses C e a in the enabling condition (cf. relation |= RS ) and C a in the activation condition (cf. |= TUA ). This is crucial for mimicking the behaviour of administrative actions of ATRBACH with those of ATRBACF . TUA 0 = (u 1 , CHR, ts 1 ), (u 1 , CHR, ts 2 ), (u 1 , CHR, ts 3 ), (u 2 , NRS , ts 3 ) and the following ATRBACF administrative actions:
where C e a = {SEC } and C a = {CHR}. For action (7) , we have:
Action (7) cannot be executed at state (RS 0 , TUA 0 , 9am) because role SEC is not enabled during time slot ts 2 (cf. item (i)). 2
Definition of τ H2F
Before defining the security mapping relating ATRBACH and ATRBACF , we introduce the following abbreviations: Senior ts (r) stands for Senior TRH ts (r) and Senior s (r) for ts∈s Senior ts (r), where s is a schedule, and Senior s (K) = Senior s (r 1 ) × · · · × Senior s (r n ), where K = {r 1 , . . . , r n } ⊆ R.
We can now define
to be such that γ H = (RS , TUA, TRH , t) and γ F = (RS , TUA, t), q H = (u g , R g , s g ) and q F = (u g , R g , {{r 1 g , . . . , r m g } | (r 1 g , . . . , r m g ) ∈ Senior sg (R g )}, s g ), and ψ F is obtained from ψ H by applying the following three transformations, one after the other, with the proviso that ψ H , ψ H , and ψ F below are the smallest relations such that (1) for each (ty, C a , ts rule , C, ts r , r) ∈ ψ H : (ty, C e a , C a , ts rule , C, ts r , r) ∈ ψ H for C e a = C a ;
(2) for each (ty, C e a , C a , ts rule , C, ts r , r) ∈ ψ H : (ty, C e a , C a , ts rule , C , ts r , r) ∈ ψ H for C a = C a ∪ {−r a | −r a ∈ C a , r a ∈ Senior ts rule (r a )} and:
.., r k a ) ∈ Senior ts rule (C + a ), or * ty ∈ {can_assign, can_revoke} and (ty, C e a , {r 1 a , . . . , r k a } ∪ C − a , ts rule , {r 1 , . . . , r l } ∪ C − , ts r , r) ∈ ψ F for (r 1 a , . . . , r k a ) ∈ Senior ts rule (C + a ) and (r 1 , . . . , r l ) ∈ Senior tsr (C + ).
Similar to the security mapping σ H2F , every SAI γ
g , . . . , R r g }, s g ) and r ≥ 1 according to how many elements are in Senior sg (R g ). It is not difficult to see that any sequence of administrative actions for γ H , q H , ψ H can be transformed into one for γ F , q F , ψ F and vice versa.
There are two important points to highlight in the transformation above. First, in steps 2 and 3, the transformation does not affect the simple pre-condition C in actions of type can_enable and can_disable. The reason is that the fact that a role is enabled (disabled, respectively) does not imply that all its junior roles are also enabled (disabled, respectively). Second, the additional component C e a of the state in Γ ATRBACF used in step 1 above to make a copy of the original administrative condition C a permits the precise encoding of the enabling condition. To understand this point, let us consider the administrative action (ty, {+r 1 }, ts rule , {+r 2 }, ts r , r) with ty ∈ {can_assign, can_revoke} and assume (r 3 , r 1 , ts rule ) ∈ TRH . The action can be executed at time instant t ∈ ts rule if there exists a user a assigned to r 3 while r 1 (not r 3 !) must be enabled at t (the fact that r 3 is enabled does not imply that r 1 is also enabled). If we ignored the information stored in the additional field C e a = {+r 1 } created in step 1 and considered only the field C a = {+r 3 } created after steps 2 and 3, then we would not be able to check that r 1 is enabled but only that r 3 is enabled. A similar observation justifies the use of queries with four fields in ATRBACF instead of only three as in ATRBACH . Example 9 Consider again the ATRBACH scheme in Example 6. We illustrate how the security mapping τ H2F works by transforming: because NDR, PRC ∈ Senior ts 3 (PRC ). (iii) The sequence σ H = (5), (6) in ATRBACH to σ F = (5) , (12), where action (5) denotes the transformed action of (5) in ATRBACH by using τ H2F . 
Correctness of τ H2F
We now claim the correctness of τ H2F by showing that τ H2F is a security mapping. This is done by proving that every SAI γ H , q H , ψ H in ATRBACH is solvable (i.e., there exists a sequence of
The main idea is to show that we can always construct a sequence of actions σ F = a F , a F , . . . , a F in ATRBACF based on σ H (and vice versa) such that γ F → σ F γ F and γ F q F . To do this, the key point is to show that for each action a H in ATRBACH , we can always find an 'equivalent' action a F in ATRBACF and vice versa. The sequence σ F (σ H , respectively) is then constructed by simply connecting all a F (a H , respectively) found for each action in σ H (σ F , respectively). This is stated by the following lemma:
Before proving the lemma, the following remark is in order. Let u be a user, ts be a time slot, C = C + ∪ C − be a pre-condition (C + and C − contain the positive and negative roles of C, respectively), and recall that u, ts |= TUA C iff user u is a member (not a member, respectively) of r in ts for each +r ∈ C + (−r ∈ C − , respectively) as shown in Definition 15. With respect to inheritance by the temporal hierarchy TRH in ATRBACH , this is formalized as follows:
(i) for each role −r j ∈ C − , all senior roles sr j ∈ Senior ts (r j ) are such that (u, sr j , ts) / ∈ TUA, and (ii) for each role +r i ∈ C + , there exists a senior role sr i of r i in time slot ts (i.e.,
where item (i) ((ii), respectively) means that all negative (positive, respectively) roles in C are satisfied. Now, we make the inheritance with respect to hierarchy TRH explicit by forming a set φ of preconditions such that:
(a) every pre-condition in φ contains C − = {−sr j |sr j ∈ Senior ts (r j )} for each −r j ∈ C, and (b) φ contains pre-condition C − ∪ C + for each C + ∈ Senior ts (C + ).
Then, it is not difficult to see that u, ts |= TUA C with respect to TRH is equisatisfiable to u, ts |= TUA φ (without TRH ), where the latter means that there exists a pre-condition C ∈ φ such that u, ts |= TUA C . This is because φ, by the way it is constructed, contains all possible inheritances (with respect to TRH ) from the original pre-condition C. We are now ready to prove Lemma 1.
Proof: [Lemma 1] For the left-to-right implication, let a H = (ty, C a , ts rule , C, ts r , r) and ty = can_assign. 4 Since (RS , TUA, TRH , t) → a H (RS , TUA , TRH , t) and recalling Definition 17 of → AT RBACH , we have the following:
1. t ∈ ts rule and ts rule |= RS C a and a, ts rule |= TUA C a , 2. u, ts r |= TUA C, where a, u ∈ U . Note that item 1 is equivalent to a, ts rule |= @t RS ,TUA C a and |= TUA is with respect to TRH . Now we form a set of actions χ of the form (ty, C a , φ a , ts rule , φ, ts r , r) in ATRBACF , where φ a and φ are created from C a and C, respectively, according to the remark above. It is easy to show that there exists a F ∈ χ such that (RS , TUA, t) → a F (RS , TUA , t) since, as shown in the remark, we also have a, ts rule |= TUA φ a and u, ts r |= TUA φ. (For enabling roles, we still have ts rule |= RS C a because temporal role hierarchies do not affect the relation RS .)
We note that the reachable states (RS , TUA , t) after executing a F and a H are the same because both actions have the same target role r (e.g., a F or a H adds tuple (u, r, ts r ) to TUA).
Finally, we show that χ ⊆ ψ F where ψ F is created by the security mapping τ H2F by observing that item (a) and (b) of the remark above are, respectively, exactly the steps (2) and (3) of the mapping τ H2F that explore all possible applications of tuples in hierarchy TRH to roles in C a and C.
For the right-to-left implication, let χ = {(ty, C a , φ a , ts rule , φ, ts r , r)} such that φ a and φ are generated from the pre-conditions C a and C of an action a H = (ty, C a , ts rule , C, ts r , r) ∈ ψ H by steps (2) and (3) of the mapping τ H2F . Assume that there exists an action a F in χ such that (RS , TUA, t) → a F (RS , TUA , t). This implies that there exists an administrator a and a user u such that a, ts rule |= TUA φ a and u, ts r |= TUA φ (see the remark above).
Given that a, ts rule |= TUA φ a and u, ts r |= TUA φ and that φ a and φ are generated from C a and C, respectively, by using tuples in hierarchy TRH , we also have a, ts rule |= TUA C a and u, ts r |= TUA C, where |= TUA is now with respect to TRH . As a consequence, we infer
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
By applying Lemma 1 to each action in the sequence σ H of ATRBACH and then connecting them in the order as in σ H , we can always construct a sequence of actions σ F in ATRBACF and vice versa. Note that actions modelling time passing in sequences σ H and σ F do not have effect on RS or TUA and thus, we simply keep such actions as they are in the constructed sequence. Again, we emphasize that executing σ H or σ F will reach the same last state because, as mentioned above, the reachable states after executing an action a H and its "equivalent" action a F are the same.
Finally, we show that the queries q F = (u g , R g , {R g } | R g ∈ Senior sg (R g )}, s g ) and q H = (u g , R g , s g ) are equisatisfiable at the last state γ = (RS , TUA, t), i.e., u g , s g |= TUA R g ⇔ u g , s g |= TUA {R g }. Indeed, {R g } is generated from R g in the same way as φ from C as in the remark; as a consequence, we can easily conclude their equisatisfiability. This and Lemma 1 allow us to conclude that every SAI γ H , q H , ψ H in ATRBACH is solvable iff γ F , q F , ψ F is so in ATRBACF . This entails the following theorem.
Theorem 2 τ H2F is a security mapping.
τ H2L : Linear Mapping
In the worst case, similar to σ H2F , the security mapping τ H2F defined in Section 4.1 can increase the size of the SAI (cf. the transformation of the query and the conditions of administrative actions) by an exponential factor. The crucial observation to avoid this problem is the following: if a user is assigned to a role r 1 during time slot ts 1 and (r 1 , r 2 , ts 1 ) ∈ TRH , then we can assume that the user is also assigned to role r 2 during ts 1 . In this case, we say that the user is implicitly assigned to role r 2 during ts 1 .
This suggests transforming each tuple in the temporal role hierarchy TRH into a new administrative action of type ican_assign (similar to those of type can_assign) such that when a user is assigned to a role r, he/she can be "implicitly" assigned to any junior role by executing the newly introduced actions.
As we need to introduce a new action of type ican_assign per junior role, it is easy to see that the number of such actions is linear in the cardinality of TRH , i.e., the number of tuples in the temporal hierarchy.
Care must be put in handling standard and implicit role membership. In fact, when a user u is assigned to a role r by a can_assign action (standard/explicit role membership), it can also be implicitly assigned to any role junior to r by an ican_assign action (implicit role membership). Now, if u is revoked from r, then also all the junior roles that have been implicitly assigned to u must be revoked. By using actions of type can_assign in ATRBAC to simulate the hierarchies, we seem to explicitly assign the user to the junior roles when the actions are executed. Thus, we need to keep track of such junior roles for every user such that a can_revoke action executed after that can know which junior roles will also be revoked from u if u is revoked from r, which is a computationally heavy task! We avoid this problem by adding a relation iTUA ⊆ U × R × TS to temporal RBAC policies and require TUA to record only explicit role memberships (i.e., those resulting from the application of can_assign actions), whereas iTUA records both explicit and implicit ones.
To do this, we consider a new type of administrative action ican_assign specified by tuples of the form (ican_assign, r , ts, r) for (r , r, ts) ∈ TRH . These actions can be executed without the supervision of administrators once an administrative action (e.g., one of type can_assign) has given a user some (senior) role. Basically, such actions will modify (add/delete some tuple to/from) the new relation iTUA introduced above.
As in Section 4.1, we first introduce the target access control scheme (Section Section 4.2.1), then define the security mapping (Section Section 4.2.2), and finally prove its correctness (Section Section 4.2.3).
Definition of ATRBACL
We define the access control scheme ATRBACL = Γ ATRBACL , Q ATRBACL , ATRBACL , Ψ ATRBACL as follows:
-Γ ATRBACL contains all pairs of the form (π, t), where t is a time instant and π = (U, R, P, RS , TUA, iTUA, PA) with U , R, P , RS , TUA and PA as in ATRBACF , and iTUA ⊆ U × R × TS . -Q ATRBACL contains all tuples of the form (u g , R g , s g ), where u g is a user, R g is a sub-set of roles and s g is a schedule. -ATRBACL is such that (RS , TUA, iTUA, t) ATRBACL (u, R, s) iff u, s |= @t RS ,iTUA {+r | r ∈ R}; note that we replace TUA by the new relation iTUA in the definition of |= @t RS ,TUA in Section 3. -Ψ ATRBACL contains Ψ ATRBACF plus all tuples of the form (ican_assign, r , ts, r) for r, r ∈ R and ts ∈ TS , i.e., contains actions of types can_enable, can_disable, can_assign, can_revoke or i _can_assign. -Finally, the definition of → ATRBACL can be derived from that of → ATRBACF in Section 4.1.1 by the following observations (we refrain from giving a formal definition since it is very similar to that of → ATRBACH from which → ATRBACF is derived): * An action of type either can_enable or can_disable modifies only RS (following case 2.a.i and 2.a.ii of the definition of → ATRBACH , respectively) and leaves unchanged both TUA and iTUA. * An action of type can_assign adds a tuple to TUA (following case 2.b.i of the definition of → ATRBACH ) and does the same to iTUA while leaving unchanged RS . * An action of type can_revoke removes a tuple from TUA (following case 2.b.ii of the definition of → ATRBACH ) and then sets iTUA to the updated value (i.e., after the removal of the tuple) of TUA. The need of resetting iTUA to TUA after removing a tuple in the second case arises from the observation that removing an explicit role membership invalidates all the implicit ones in iTUA related to it. * An action (ican_assign, r , ts, r) does not require an administrator in order to be executed; it only requires a check that there exists a user u who is member of role r at time slot ts to add the tuple (u, r, ts) to iTUA while leaving both TUA and RS unchanged.
Definition of τ H2L
We can now define the following security mapping
to be such that:
γ H = (RS , TUA, TRH , t) and γ L = (RS , TUA, iTUA, t), q H = (u g , R g , s g ) and q L = (u g , R g , s g ), and ψ L is the smallest relation obtained from ψ H as follows:
(1) for each (ty, C a , ts rule , C, ts r , r) ∈ ψ H : (ty, C e a , C a , ts rule , C, ts r , r) ∈ ψ L where C e a = C a , (2) for each (ty, C e a , C a , ts rule , C, ts r , r) ∈ ψ H : (ty, C e a , C a , ts rule , C , ts r , r) ∈ ψ L where C a = C a ∪ {−r a | −r a ∈ C a and r a ∈ Senior ts rule (r a )}, * C = C if ty ∈ {can_enable, can_disable}, * C = C ∪ {−r | −r ∈ C and r ∈ Senior tsr (r)} if ty ∈ {can_assign, can_revoke}, (3) for each (r 1 , r 2 , ts) ∈ TRH , (ican_assign, r 1 , ts, r 2 ) ∈ ψ L .
Note that step (1) adds the original enabling condition C e a to every administrative action as in the mapping τ H2F . The reason to do this is to keep track of information about the roles that must be enabled/disabled when checking whether an action can be executed or not (cf. the explanation in Section 4.1). Step (2) processes negative roles in conditions C a and C and step (3) adds ican_assign actions with respect to the hierarchy TRH to the set of actions ψ.
Contrary to the mapping τ H2F , every SAI γ H , q H , ψ H in ATRBACH with q H = (u g , R g , s g ) is mapped to only one γ L , q L , ψ L in ATRBACL by τ H2L with q L = (u g , R g , s g ), thereby avoiding the exponential blow up in the size of the resulting SAI. In particular, the number of administrative actions resulting from the application of τ H2L is much lower than those resulting from the application of τ H2F .
Correctness of τ H2L
We show the correctness of τ H2L by proving that τ H2L is a security mapping. The main argument of the proof, which we give below, is the following. The application of an administrative action a H of type can_assign in Ψ ATRBACH can be simulated (in ATRBACL) by a sequence of actions of type ican_assign that assign an administrator and a regular user to junior roles, then followed by executing the action a H itself. This is illustrated in Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2 Let ρ L be a sequence of actions of the form ia L , ia L , ia L , . . . , a L in ATRBACL, where a L is an action of type ca = can_assign 5 and the other actions are of type ican_assign. Then
where γ H = (RS , TUA, TRH , t), γ H = (RS , TUA , TRH , t), γ L = (RS , TUA, iTUA, t) and γ L = (RS , TUA , iTUA , t).
Before proving the lemma, we observe that the execution of an action (ican_assign, r 1 , ts, r 2 ) in ATRBACL is "equivalent" to the application of a tuple (r 1 , r 2 , ts) in hierarchy TRH in ATRBACH . Indeed, ican_assign actions can be executed anytime without any constraint to assign a user u having a senior role r 1 to the junior role r 2 . In ATRBACH , this is simulated by using the tuple (r 1 , r 2 , ts) to make role r 2 inheritable by a user u anytime provided that u currently has role r 1 (i.e., u is implicitly assigned to role r 2 ). The execution of a sequence of ican_assign actions, e.g., (ican_assign, r 1 , ts, r 2 ) and then (ican_assign, r 2 , ts, r 3 ) to assign u to the most junior role r 3 , is "equivalent" to the use of a sequence of tuples (r 1 , r 2 , ts) and (r 2 , r 3 , ts) in ATRBACH .
Proof: [Lemma 2] Let a H = (ca, C a , ts rule , C, ts r , r) and a L = (ca, C a , C a , ts rule , C , ts r , r) be obtained by applying τ H2L on a H . For the left-to-right implication, we assume that a H is executed on user u satisfying the pre-condition C (e.g., u, ts r |= TUA C). That is, u is a (implicit or explicit) member of positive roles and not a (implicit or explicit) member of negative roles according to both TUA and TRH . As observed above, to (implicitly) assign u to each role +r ∈ C, we may have used a sequence σ of tuples in the hierarchy TRH (in a certain order) given that user u is currently assumed to play in a certain senior role of r. In ATRBACL, we can get the same effect by executing a sequence of ican_assign actions on user u such that the first ican_assign action corresponds to the first tuple of the sequence σ in ATRBACH and so on. This is because each ican_assign simulates exactly the effect of a tuple in the hierarchy TRH as in the observation above. After executing the sequence of ican_assign actions, u is also assigned to +r ∈ C in ATRBACL, i.e., (u, r, ts r ) ∈ iTUA (recall that ican_assign actions update only iTUA). Now, the sequence ρ L in ATRBACL is constructed by collecting all the sequences of ican_assign actions generated for each +r ∈ C as described above. Clearly, after executing ρ L , u satisfies the precondition C in a L since u, by executing a certain sequence of ican_assign actions in ρ L , satisfies every role +r in C . Note that we do not consider negative roles because they are processed as in τ H2F (cf. Step (2) in τ H2L ).
We can generate a sequence of ican_assign actions for each role in administrative condition C a in the same way as for C and this sequence is also added to ρ L . At this point, it is not difficult to see that action a L is now executable because C a and C are satisfied (after executing sequences of ican_assign actions in ρ L ). Then, the final step is to add the action a L to the end of the sequence ρ L .
Finally, we emphasize that final states γ H (after executing a H ) and γ L (after executing the sequence ρ L ) have the same RS and TUA . Indeed, given that a H and a L contain the same target roles and given the definition of → ATRBACL (i.e., keep all effects to RS and TUA as in → ATRBACH ), executing a H in ATRBACH updates RS and TUA of γ H in the same way as executing a L on γ L in ATRBACL. This implies that the executions of a H and ρ L have the same effect on current state γ H and γ L , respectively, since all ican_assign actions in ρ L only have effect on iTUA while leaving RS and TUA unchanged (cf. the definition of → ATRBACL ).
For the right-to-left direction, we argue that an executable sequence ρ L = . . . , a L in ATRBACL, where '. . . ' stands for any sequence of ican_assign, implies that a H in ATRBACH is also executable. We assume that a L = (ca, C a , C a , ts rule , C , ts r , r) is executable in ATRBACL on user u satisfying the pre-condition C , i.e.:
(c) (u, r, ts r ) ∈ iTUA for each +r ∈ C , and (d) (u, r, ts r ) / ∈ iTUA for each −r ∈ C .
Note that iTUA is always obtained from TUA by executing actions of type ican_assign simulating the temporal hierarchy. Thus, (u, r, ts r ) ∈ iTUA iff either (i) (u, r, ts r ) is also in TUA or (ii) there exists (u, r , ts r ) ∈ TUA, where r is a senior role of r and executing a certain sequence of ican_assign actions to "implicitly" assign u to r (this sequence can be seen as a part of ". . . " in ρ L above). In the context of ATRBACH , this means that we have to use a set of tuples in hierarchy TRH (those corresponding to the ican_assign actions used) in a certain order to implicitly assign u to one more junior role and then to another junior role and so on until we reach the most junior role +r ∈ C. We do not consider negative roles −r in C because, as argued in the proof of the left-to-right direction, τ H2L processes them as in τ H2F . A similar explanation can be applied to roles in C a and C a of a L and a H , respectively. As a consequence, the fact that a L is executable (since both C a and C are satisfied after executing ρ L ) implies that the action a H is also executable. Additionally, as argued above, a H and a L have the same target roles. Thus, the executions of a H and a L (or, in general ρ L ) have the same effects on RS and TUA.
Example 10 Consider again the ATRBACH scheme in Example 6. We illustrate how the security mapping τ H2L works as follows:
(i)
Step (1) 
(iv) The query q H = q L = (u 2 , PRC , ts 3 ).
(v) The sequence σ H = (5), (6) in ATRBACH will be transformed to σ L = (5) , (15), (16) , (13) , where action (5) denotes the transformed action of (5) in ATRBACH by using τ H2L . Note that in the sequence σ L , we need to execute the ican_assign action (15) to assign user u 1 having senior role CHR to junior role SEC . Also, the ican_assign action (16) is used to assign u 2 to junior role EMP . 2
Theorem 3 τ H2L is a security mapping.
Proof: [Theorem 3] Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we show that τ H2L is a security mapping by showing that (i) we can always construct a sequence of actions σ L in ATRBACL from a sequence σ H = a H , a H , . . . , a H in ATRBACH and vice versa, and (ii) q H and q L are equisatisfiability. Indeed, by applying Lemma 2 on each action a H of σ H , we get a set of sequences of the form ρ L above. The sequence σ L is then constructed by connecting sequences in the set with respect to the order of corresponding actions a H in σ H . To construct σ H from σ L , we observe that σ L always has the form ". . . , a L , . . . , a L , . . .", where ". . ." is any sequence of ican_assign actions. Then, applying Lemma 2 on each sequence ". . . , a L " in σ L (note that we can ignore the last ". . ." appearing in σ L since ican_assign actions do not affect relations RS and TUA), we get a set of can_assign actions. The sequence σ H is constructed by connecting all the actions in the order.
Finally, the equisatisfiability of queries q H and q L on the last state γ H and γ L obtained by executing σ H and σ L , respectively, is explained as follows. First, it is not difficult to see that relations RS and TUA of the last states γ H and γ L are the same since, as stated in the proof of Lemma 2, each action a H in σ H and the corresponding sequence ρ L in σ L have the same effect on RS and TUA. Second, the relation iTUA is always obtained from TUA by executing ican_assign actions simulating the use of tuples in the hierarchy TRH . Thus, the query q H is satisfied with respect to the relation TUA (of the last state γ H ) and the use of tuples in TRH implies that the query q L is also satisfied with respect to the relation iTUA (of state γ L ) obtained by executing the corresponding ican_assign actions on the relation TUA and vice versa.
τ H2M : Multi-target Mapping
A possible problem with τ H2L arises when the depth of the temporal hierarchy is large since this implies the execution of a large number of ican_assign actions to simulate just one can_assign action in ATRBACH . To understand why, it is useful to introduce the notion of depth of a temporal hierarchy TRH as the number of tuples in the longest chain of the form (r 1 , r 2 , ts), (r 2 , r 3 , ts), ..., (r n , r n+1 , ts) for (r i , r i+1 , ts) ∈ TRH with i = 1, ..., n and for each time slot ts ∈ TS . Then, consider Example 10 and imagine a temporal role hierarchy of depth n. In this case, we may need to execute n ican_assign actions to assign a user to the most junior role. This may affect negatively the performance of the model checker in charge of exploring all possible interleavings of the available administrative actions by considerably enlarging its search space. To avoid this problem, we introduce a new mapping that "combines" the effects of several ican_assign actions into one. The idea is to define a new version mican_assign of ican_assign that assigns to a user all the junior roles of a given role in one shot.
We define the access control scheme
-Ψ ATRBACM contains Ψ ATRBACH plus all tuples of the form (mican_assign, r, ts, Junior ts (r)), where Junior ts (r) = {r | (r, r ) ∈ TRH ts } for r ∈ R and ts ∈ TS . Also the actions of type mican_assign can be executed without the supervision of an administrator and their effect is the same as that obtained by executing atomically, one after the other, the administrative actions (ican_assign, r, ts, r ) defined in Section 4.2, for each r ∈ Junior ts (r). -→ ATRBACM is defined as → ATRBACL except that the effect of the ican_assign action is now replaced by that of the mican_assign action.
The definition of τ H2M can be derived from that of τ H2L by replacing step (3) of τ H2L in Section 4.2 with the following:
(3 ) for each role r ∈ R, time slot ts ∈ TS , if Junior ts (r) = ∅ then (mican_assign, r, ts, Junior ts (r)) ∈ ψ L .
Theorem 4 τ H2M is a security mapping.
This is a corollary of Theorem 3 since the effect of a mican_assign action in ATRBACM can always be simulated by a (finite) sequence of actions of type ican_assign in ATRBACL.
Example 11
Consider again the ATRBACH scheme in Example 6. We illustrate how the security mapping τ H2M works as follows:
(i) Administrative actions in ψ are processed by steps (1) and (2) as in τ H2L (see Example 10). (ii) Step (3 ) adds the following actions of type mican_assign to ψ:
(mican_assign, +CHR, ts 2 , SEC )
(mican_assign, +NRS , ts 3 , EMP )
(mican_assign, +CHR, ts 3 , SEC )
(mican_assign, +NDR, ts 3 , PRC )
(mican_assign, +HED, ts 3 , {NDR, PRC })
(iii) The query q H = q L = q M = (u 2 , PRC , ts 3 ).
(iv) We only need to execute the mican_assign action (25) to assign any user having senior role HED to the most junior role PRC instead of the two ican_assign actions (18) and (19) as in Example 10. 2
Implementation and Experiments
We have implemented the three security mappings τ H2F , τ H2L and τ H2M in ASASPTIME, which, by using a symbolic model checker, is capable of processing the generated SAIs. In the following, we first describe our extended version of ASASPTIME (in Section 5.1) and then discuss the findings of our experiments (in Section 5.2).
ASASPTIME: a Safety Analysis Tool for ATRBAC Policies without Role Hierarchies
Following [27] , we reduce the SAI problems for the three target access control systems (namely, ATRBACF , ATRBACL and ATRBACM ) defined in Section 4 to a reachability problem of a particular class of symbolic transition systems expressed by first-order logic formulae. In turn, such a problem is reduced to a finite sequence of constraint satisfaction problems. Here, we briefly recall the main no-tions underlying the approach in [27] that reduces a SAI problem to a sequence of constraint satisfaction problems that are compactly described by using a class of first-order logic formulae. Such a class, called Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey (BSR), contains formulae of the form ∃x.∀y.ϕ(x, y) for ϕ a Boolean combination of atomic sub-formulae built out of equality, predicates, constants (functions are not allowed), and variables in the tuples x, y. It is well-known (see, e.g., [26] ) that the constraint satisfiability problem for BSR formulae is decidable and NEXPTIME complete. Practical approaches to building efficient procedures that handle this class of formulae (see again [26] ) are available in state-of-the-art theorem provers, called Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT); see, e.g., [8] for an introduction to SMT solving and its applications. In the following, we show how SMT solvers can be used to support the reachability analysis of a class of symbolic transition systems expressed by using BSR formulae.
Definition 18
An adequate BSR symbolic transition system (adequate BSR-STS, for short) is a tuple s, Ax, In, Tr , where s is a (finite) sequence of predicates, called the state variables, -Ax is a (finite) set of BSR formulae, called axioms, -In(s) is a universal BSR formula (i.e., a BSR formula of the form ∀y.ϕ(y)), 6 called the initial state formula, and -Tr is a (finite) disjunction of BSR formulae of the form
called transition formulae, where * s is the sequence obtained from s by priming each element, * x and y are tuples of variables, * G(s) is a quantifier-free (BSR) formula, called the guard, containing the variables in x as free variables, and where each occurrence of the predicate symbols in s are applied to variables in x, and * U s (s, y) is a quantifier-free (BSR) formula, called the update, containing the variables in x, y as free variables, and where the length of y matches the arity of s, and each occurrence of the predicate symbols in s is applied to variables in x, y.
The reachability problem for an adequate BSR-STS s, Ax, In, Tr and an existential BSR formula γ(s) (i.e., a BSR formula of the form ∃x.ϕ(x)), called the goal, consists of establishing whether there exists an integer n ≥ 0 such that
is satisfiable, where τ (s, s ) := tr∈Tr tr(s, s ) and the sequence s i is obtained from s by uniquely renaming each of its elements by appending the suffix i (for i = 0, . . . , n). For clarity, if φ(s) is a formula containing symbols from s, then φ(s i ) is the formula obtained from φ by pairwise replacement of each element in s with the corresponding one in s i . A monadic BSR-STS is an adequate BSR-STS whose predicates are unary.
Theorem 5 ( [27] ) The reachability problem for monadic BSR-STSs is decidable.
The proof of the theorem in [27] is constructive. It presents a procedure that generates a sequence of BSR formulae representing sets of backward reachable states. The procedure has been implemented in the tool ASASPTIME [29] with some heuristics for scalability.
To simplify the translation from the three access control systems ATRBACF , ATRBACL and ATRBACM , we use the following extension of the notion of monadic BSR-STS by considering a manysorted (typed) version of first-order logic (see, e.g., [14] for formal definitions). An effectively monadic BSR-STS is an adequate BSR-STS whose predicate symbols are n-ary for n ≥ 0 and such that at least n − 1 arguments range over enumerated datatypes. An enumerated datatype is formalized by considering a sort symbol S, constants e 1 , . . . , e n , and the following set Enum({e 1 , . . . , e n }, S) of formulae e i = e j for distinct i, j in {1, . . . , n} (28) ∀x.(x = e 1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = e n ) .
It is always possible [27] to transform an effectively monadic BSR-STS into a monadic BSR-STS.
Corollary 1 The reachability problem for effectively monadic BSR-STSs is decidable.
This result has been applied to the safety analysis of Administrative Temporal RBAC policies without role hierarchies [29] corresponding to SAI problems for ATRBACF . The main advantage in developing safety analysis based on Corollary 1 is the following. The user-role reachability problem is solved with respect to a finite but unknown number of users in the policies manipulated by the administrative actions. When the goal is unreachable, the safety certification takes into account the fact that users may join or leave the organization in which the policies are administered. When the goal is reachable, the technique is capable of establishing the number of users needed for some sequence of administrative actions to transform the initial policy into one satisfying the goal (usually obtained by negating a security goal). Figure 1 shows the architecture of the (extended) version of ASASPTIME. The three mappings τ H2F , τ H2L and τ H2M have been described in Section 4. The box labelled BR is the symbolic procedure briefly sketched above, which uses BSR formulae to represent sets of backward reachable states. The box labelled TR implements the translations from the three access control systems ATRBACF , ATRBACL and ATRBACM to effectively monadic BSR-STSs. For the sake of conciseness, we avoid to give the definitions of these translations; instead, we illustrate how they work on a concrete instance of ATRBACF (the translations for ATRBACL and ATRBACM are similar and are thus omitted).
Before presenting the example, we observe that, in order to solve SAI problems for ATRBACF (and also for ATRBACL and ATRBACM ), we do not need to keep track of the current time t in the state (RS , TUA, t) but only the time slot ts that t belongs to. In fact, for any time instants t, t belonging to the same time slot, if the administrative action τ = (ty, C e a , C a , s rule , C, s r , r) can be executed at t, then τ can also be executed at t and vice versa (e.g., |= @t RS ,TUA and |= @t RS ,TUA are identical). For this reason, without loss of generality, we assume that the state of any ATRBACF system is of the form (RS , TUA, ts), where ts is a time slot. The initial state (RS 0 , TUA 0 , ts 1 ) is translated into the following universal formula In(s):
∀x, y, z.
The translation of action (can_assign, SEC , CHR,
which is exactly of the form (26) 
The other administrative actions are translated in a similar way and are omitted. The query q = (u 1 , PRC , PRC , ts 3 ) is translated into the following existential BSR formula:
We can easily see that the formulae above satisfy the conditions for an effectively monadic BSR-STS. As a consequence, we can solve the problem by the symbolic backward reachability procedure briefly sketched above which will return unreachable (according to what has been discussed in Example 8). To summarize, ASASPTIME takes as input a SAI for ATRBACH , i.e., a reachability problem for Administrative Temporal RBAC policies with role hierarchies, first applies one of the three security mappings (τ H2F , τ H2L , or τ H2M ), then translates the resulting problem into a symbolic reachability problem for adequate BSR-STSs (by invoking TR), and finally runs the reachability procedure (by invoking BR) in order to establish if the goal is reachable or unreachable. If the goal is reachable, then ASASPTIME returns solvable together with a sequence of administrative actions; otherwise, it returns unsolvable. The returned answer is in terms of the original SAI for ATRBACH .
Experiments
To evaluate the scalability of the three security mappings, we generate synthetic benchmarks as follows: we use the ATRBAC user-role reachability problems from [29] and add randomly generated temporal role hierarchies organized as lattices with a senior-most and a junior-most role. 7 The choice of this kind of temporal role hierarchies has been inspired by the discussion about the shape of hierarchies in [22] and the well-known fact (see, e.g., [12] ) that it is always possible to compute a lattice containing a partial order as a sub-order by using the so-called completion process. So, there is no loss of generality with respect to expressiveness in considering role hierarchies structured as lattices. Furthermore, we do not consider problematic the (possible) exponential growth in the number of roles resulting from completion since the experiments below aim to evaluate the scalability of our technique.
A generated temporal role hierarchy TRH is such that TRH (a,a+1) and TRH (a+1,a+2) are "similar," i.e., the cardinality of their intersection is close to their cardinalities. This seems to be a reasonable assumption inspired by a sort of "locality" principle: role hierarchies in contiguous time slots should not look very different. The benchmarks contain policies whose number of roles ranges from 15 to 34, the number of administrative actions ranges from 127 to 994, the number of time slots ranges from 5 to 40, the cardinality |TRH | and the height h((R, TRH )) of the temporal role hierarchy TRH range from 50 to 600 and from 3 to 32, respectively. 8 At a first glance, the maximum values in the ranges above may seem unrealistic; specifically those for the number of administrative actions and the cardinality of Fig. 2 . Results on benchmarks from [29] extended with randomly generated temporal role hierarchies the relation TRH . This is not the case for the following two reasons. The former is the result of the multiplicative effect of splitting the sets s rule and s r in an administrative rule (ty, C a , s rule , C, s r , r) into singletons (this transformation has been described in the last paragraph before Section 4.1). For the latter, recall that TRH ⊆ R × R × TS so that increasing the number of time slots in TS yields larger values of |TRH |. Fig. 2 shows the results of our experiments run on an Intel QuadCore (3.6 GHz) CPU with 16 GB RAM and Ubuntu 11.10. There are two benchmark classes: one inspired by a hospital (plot on the left) and one by a university (plot on the right). For each benchmark in a class, the three bars show the average time (in seconds) taken by ASASPTIME using the security mapping τ H2F , τ H2L or τ H2M (from left to right) to solve 15 security analysis instances with a given number Roles of roles, a given number Rules of administrative actions (called rules, for short), a given number of time slots TS, and the cardinality of the temporal role hierarchy |TRH | (the tuple Roles/Rules/TS/|TRH | shown on the x-axis of the plots). The two plots clearly show the superiority of the last security mapping τ H2M over the other two. It is also clear that τ H2F is the less scalable of the three. The reason is the reduced number of administrative actions generated by τ H2M in comparison with τ H2F . For the benchmarks in the Hospital class, the number of actions generated by τ H2M is between 1.2 and 2.1 times the number of actions in the original policy, whereas those generated by τ H2F is between 2.3 and 63.1 times. For the benchmarks in the University class, the gap is even wider with the number of actions generated by τ H2M being between 1.4 and 1.7 times the number of actions in the original policy and those generated by τ H2F being between 3.8 and 56.3 times. The better behaviour of τ H2M over τ H2L is due to the fact that the former generates actions whose effect combines those of several actions generated by the latter, as explained in Section 4.3. Fig. 3 (left) shows the behaviour of ASASPTIME using the three security mappings when the cardinality (left) of the temporal role hierarchy increases, from 50 to 500, and the height is fixed to 5. Fig. 3 (right) shows the behaviour of the tool when using the three security mappings with increasing values, from 3 to 30, of the height h((R, TRH )) of the temporal role hierarchy TRH and the cardinality |TRH | of temporal hierarchies is fixed to 200. In both cases, we picked one problem from the university benchmark and added randomly generated temporal hierarchies as follows. For each value of the cardinality (left) and the height (right), we generated 15 different temporal role hierarchies and extended the policy. The average time (in seconds) taken to solve each resulting problem is plotted in Fig. 3 : the blue diamonds line shows the behaviour of τ H2F , the green squares line that of τ H2L and the violet triangles line that of τ H2M . As for the previous set of experiments, τ H2M performs much better than the other two and seems to have a polynomial (rather than exponential) growth.
We observe that it is difficult (if possible at all) to perform a comparison with other tools since, to the best of our knowledge, they do not support temporal role hierarchies. We argue why this is so in Section 6 when discussing how to apply our approach to the analysis of policies with dynamic temporal role hierarchies (as in [42] ) rather than static (as in this work).
Related Work
There is a long line of works on the safety analysis of access control policies that started with the seminal paper [17] . To the best of our knowledge, Li and Tripunitara [23] were the first to introduce security analysis in the context of ARBAC, followed by many papers, e.g., [21, 3, 38, 24, 39, 6, 1, 7, 18, 15, 31, 28, 44, 10] . The idea underlying such works is to reduce safety analysis to graph manipulation [21, 3, 38] or fix-point computation performed either by Logic Programming (as in [24] ) or model checking (as in [39, 6, 1, 7, 18, 15, 31, 28, 44] ).
The analysis techniques for RBAC that are currently available are not readily applicable to extensions in which authorizations depend also on contextual information, such as time, that are widely used in real-world applications. For instance, two temporal extensions of RBAC are discussed in [9, 20] . These models impose temporal constraints on roles being enabled for them to be assigned to users. In these models, the executability of administrative actions is also restricted by temporal constraints. Only few works, i.e., [25, 41, 29, 35] , have proposed techniques for the automated analysis of safety problems for ATRBAC models. In [25] , the safety problem for ATRBAC policies is reduced to verification problems of timed automata [2] , whose solution is supported by the model checker UPPAAL (http://www.uppaal.org). The approach supports the verification of a variety of properties, not only those for safety, but has the drawback of assuming a fixed set of users; every time the set of users changes, the analysis must be re-run. Additionally, the size of the state space to be explored by the model checker grows exponentially in the number of users, making the technique difficult to scale. The approach proposed in [41] amounts to decomposing safety of ATRBAC policies into reachability problems for policies that can be expressed in a model that is (close to) URA97. In this way, existing tools (such as RBAC-PAT [16] or VAC [15] ) for the safety of URA97 administrative policies can be re-used. One of the main advantages of [41] is the possibility to leverage recent advances in the analysis of ARBAC policies.
The main disadvantage is the state-space explosion since several safety problems for URA97 must be solved and the complexity of many restricted versions of this problem is known to be NP-hard [34] . The approach in [29] amounts to translating safety problems to (decidable) reachability problems of BSR-STSs to solve them. The analysis technique built on top of the model checker can solve reachability problems for ATRBAC systems with a finite but unknown number of users. In this way, the technique is capable of certifying safety by taking into account that users may join or leave the organization in which the TRBAC policies are administered since the certificate holds for any (finite) number of users. Similarly, it can discover the number of users required for a certain sequence of administrative actions to turn the initial policy into one violating a security goal. This dramatically enlarges the scope of applicability of the analysis and thus the usefulness of its results. Recently, Shahen et al. [35] proposed an approach to leverage an existing analysis tool to solve the safety problem in ATRBAC. The main idea is to reduce the safety problems in ATRBAC to the safety problems in ARBAC and then use MOHAWK [18] , an analysis tool for ARBAC system, to reason on the problems.
Unfortunately, the approaches above cannot deal with temporal role hierarchies, which is originally a component of the temporal RBAC model. In [42] , Uzun et al. recognize the importance of temporal role hierarchies in the context of administrative policies and propose to extend the administrative model in [41] with dynamic temporal role hierarchies, i.e., relative positions of roles in the hierarchy can be modified, as opposed to the static model considered in this paper. In [43] , among other things, Uzun et al. implement the approach given in [42] . The approach they propose firstly decomposes the original analysis problem into four independent steps that correspond to the analysis of the relations TUA, RS , temporal PA and dynamic TRH , respectively. The approach performs the steps separately and then combines the results returned by the four steps to conclude the answer for the original analysis problem. This decomposition is justified by an interpretation of the administrative actions that deviates from the semantics of pre-conditions in ARBAC [32] . For instance, [43] interprets a pre-condition on the user in can_assign actions with respect to the direct role membership relation instead of the indirect one. More in detail, assume that the execution of an action (can_assign, C a , s rule , C, s r , r), which modifies the relation TUA, is determined by TUA only. When the administrative pre-condition C a is satisfied, the action can be executed if there exists a user u such that u and s r satisfy pre-condition C under only the relation TUA and not considering the relation TRH (see, Definitions 15, 16 and 17) . Indeed, this greatly simplifies the analysis of the temporal RBAC policy in general, and the policy with temporal role hierarchy in particular. Unfortunately, the results of such an analysis may be confusing for policy designers used to the semantics of pre-conditions proposed in [32] . In this paper, instead, we consider a semantics for pre-conditions that closely follows the spirit of [32] and we model that the execution of an administrative action is determined by all the relations in the model. In this sense, we believe this work to be the first to consider all aspects of the temporal role hierarchy in the analysis of ATRBAC.
The works in [19] and [37] are another attempt to consider the security analysis problem in the TRBAC policy. In the papers, the authors firstly propose an administrative model for TRBAC, namely AMTRAC (Administrative Model for Temporal Role-based Access Control), and define a number of security properties for TRBAC. Then, they present a methodology for performing security analysis of TRBAC that uses Alloy to formally represent TRBAC systems and administrative actions in AMTRAC. The methodology then exploits the Alloy analyser to solve the security analysis problem. Indeed, in [19] , the authors claim that the AMTRAC model is more complete than the ATRBAC model proposed by Uzun et al. in [43] given that AMTRAC includes: (i) all administrative actions of the ARBAC model (non-temporal components of AMTRAC), and (ii) a new set of administrative actions that modify the role enabling base assignment including role triggers (temporal components of AMTRAC), while the ATRBAC model does not support role triggers. Furthermore, the difference between the two models is also in (i): the ATRBAC model does not include exactly the original administrative actions in the ARBAC model like AMTRAC but "temporalises" them by adding time schedules s rule and s r (cf. Definitions 16). Since the administrative model considered in Section 3 and in our previous works in [29, 30] , as well as in [36] , is based on the ATRBAC model proposed in [43] , our analysis techniques are designed for the ATRBAC model and their application to the AMTRAC model requires further investigation, which is left as future work.
Conclusions and future work
We have defined three mappings τ H2F , τ H2L and τ H2M from ATRBACH , an access control scheme corresponding to the ATRBAC model with the presence of static temporal role hierarchy, to three access control schemes whose SAIs can be easily handled by available analysis techniques. The main idea underlying the mappings is to encode the effect of role hierarchies in the administrative actions. The mappings represent increasingly sophisticated variants of this idea and try to alleviate the state-space explosion problem deriving from the huge number of possible interleavings with which administrative actions can be executed. We have shown the application of the mappings to automated policy analysis and implemented them in the tool ASASPTIME. The experimental evaluation shows the superiority of τ H2M over τ H2F and τ H2L since the first allows for the generation of problems with smaller state spaces. To the best of our knowledge, ASASPTIME is the first tool capable of reasoning in presence of temporal role hierarchies striking a good trade-off between scalability and precision with which the semantics of ATRBACH is taken into consideration (as discussed in Section 6).
The main line of future work is to extend our approach to cope with the dynamic temporal role hierarchies-i.e., the temporal role hierarchy can be changed by adding/deleting some tuple by administrators-as done in [42] . Doing this requires us to extend the mappings defined in this work to also encode changes to the relation TRH . We plan to do this by using the actions ican_assign (introduced in Section 4.2) and mican_assign (introduced in Section 4.3) along the following lines. First, we represent all possible role relationships (r , r, ts) by using a set of ican_assign actions as in τ H2L . Then, the effect of administrative actions that modify the dynamic role hierarchy TRH can be simulated by enabling or disabling the execution of the corresponding ican_assign actions. For instance, adding a tuple (r 1 , r 2 , ts) to the dynamic role hierarchy will make the action (ican_assign, r 1 , ts, r 2 ) enabled and vice versa. At this point, the dynamic role hierarchy can be abstracted away (as it is encoded by a set of ican_assign actions) and it is thus possible to reuse available analysis techniques as in Section 5.1 to solve the user-role reachability problem in the context of a dynamic role hierarchy. The main roadblock to achieve this is the presence of negative roles in the pre-conditions C a and C of an administrative action (cf. step (2) of τ H2L and τ H2M in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, respectively). In fact, with dynamic role hierarchies, the set of roles that are senior to the negative roles in C a and C may change (instead this is not possible which temporal role hierarchies are static) so that the set of senior roles prior to the addition or deletion of some tuples in TRH may no longer be valid and needs to be replaced with the updated version. Thus, we need further sophisticated mechanisms to handle changes in the set of senior roles and in pre-conditions of administrative actions. The details of how to do this are currently being investigated.
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Notion Description Location
Access control scheme Γ, Q, , Ψ , where Γ is the set of states, Q is a set of queries, : Γ × Q → {true, false} is the query answering relation, and Ψ is a set of transition rules Definition 1, Section 2
Access control system (γ, ψ), where γ ∈ Γ and ψ ⊆ Ψ Definition 2, Section 2 SAI: Security analysis instance γ, q, ψ , where γ ∈ Γ, q ∈ Q and ψ ⊆ Ψ; asks whether there exists γ ∈ Γ such that γ is ψ-reachable from γ and γ q 
